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Abstract 
 
 
Based on a nationwide survey, this article focuses on the 
perceptions of COSATU members on two of the central issues 
that have dominated debates on the South African labour 
movement: the advisability of COSATU’s Alliance with the 
ANC and the extent of internal union democracy. The survey 
revealed that the ANC-Alliance continues to enjoy mass 
support, whilst internal democracy remains robust.  At the 
same time, the federation faces the challenges of coping 
with – and contesting - neo-liberal reforms, retaining and 
reenergizing rank and file in the post-apartheid era, and 
in reaching out to potential members in the informal sector 
and other areas of insecure work. 
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The South African labour movement has been a source of 
inspiration to unions worldwide. South Africa’s largest and 
most active union federation, the Congress of South African 
Trade Unions (COSATU) has retained high levels of 
penetration in the private sector, and made concerted 
inroads into the public sector. At the same time, the 
federation has faced the challenges of coping with – and 
contesting - neo-liberal reforms, retaining and 
reenergizing rank and file in the post-apartheid era, and 
in reaching out to potential members in the informal sector 
and other areas of insecure work.  
 
There are many ways of explaining union effectiveness and 
potential: these could include comparisons of legal 
contexts, and broad analyses of membership trends, 
bargaining outcomes and the incidence of industrial 
disputes (Godard 2004; Rigby et al. 2004).  However, 
central to understanding union strength – and indeed, 
industrial relations more generally – are the orientations 
of workers, how they conceptualize their interests, and the 
manner in which this is reflected in organizational culture 
and structure (Kelly 1998: 23; Kelly and Frege 2004: 182-
183; Gall 2003: 2).  Whilst there is a considerable body of 
literature on unions in South Africa (c.f. Bramble and 
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Barciesi 2003; Donnelly and Dunn 2006; Baskin 1991; Von 
Holdt 2002), most of this work has focused on an analysis 
of general trends, or on detailed case study based 
research. In contrast, based on a nationwide survey, this 
article focuses on the perceptions of COSATU members on two 
of the central concerns that have dominated debates on the 
South African labour movement: the advisability of COSATU’s 
alliance with the ruling African National Congress (ANC) 
and the extent of internal union democracyi (Barchiesi and 
Bramble 2003; Donnelly and Dunn 2006; Baskin 1991; Von 
Holdt 2002; Buhlungu 2006b; Hlatswayo 2005). These two 
issues are related to each other in that the ANC-Alliance 
will only be sustained if the rank and file support it 
and/or if the latter are disempowered within union 
structures (ibid.). Any engagement with political parties 
by unions invariably leads to compromises, which may 
necessitate unions reigning in rank and file and/or 
grassroots pressures that will contest – and potentially 
break – any centralized deals (Harcourt and Wood 2002; Von 
Holdt 2002; Buhlungu 2006b; c.f. Olson 1982). These issues 
will, in turn, affect the extent to which the unions can 
impact on national level policy, and the degree to which 
they can attract and retain members, and effectively 
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represent their interests (Hlatswayo 2005; Von Holdt 2002; 
Barciesi and Bramble 2003; c.f. Gall 2003: 2).   
 
Background: The Rise of COSATU 
 
The history of South African trade unions prior to 1973 is 
one of exclusive unionism, punctuated by periodic attempts 
to promote more broadly based alternatives and to build a 
common unity. South Africa’s first unions were organized by 
immigrant white craft workers.  An early tradition of 
militancy culminated in the 1922 Rand Rebellion, with white 
miners seizing central Johannesburg, only to face an 
outright military assault including aerial bombing.  A 
political backlash led to a historic compromise between 
white workers, state and business being forged, whereby the 
former traded off militancy in return for job protection on 
race lines (Simons and Simons 1969).  This compromise was 
embodied in the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act, which 
provided for centralized industry level bargaining, but 
excluded Africans (as they were not defined as employees in 
terms of the Act): whilst centralized bargaining had many 
benefits, this made for complacency, and a neglect of 
workplace organization (Webster 1986). This was backed up 
by the proliferation of statutory racial job reservation, 
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with white workers relying on their political clout to 
secure their privilege on the grounds of race (Wilson 
1972).    
 
Yet, this only constitutes one strand of South African 
labour history.  There were numerous attempts made to 
specifically organize black workers. The Industrial and 
Commercial Workers Union (ICU) of the 1920s made impressive 
gains, albeit among a wide category of workers, including 
farm workers and peasants (Bonner 1978). It centred on the 
personality of a single individual; attempts to broaden the 
leadership and organizational base led to destructive 
leadership squabbles (Bonner 1978).  By the late 1920s, it 
had experienced an equally rapid decline in its fortunes; 
attempts to relaunch the union made only limited headway 
(Bonner 1978).   
 
If the lessons of the ICU were to avoid an over-reliance on 
a single charismatic personality, and to concentrate on 
core factory workers, communist initiated unionization 
attempts in the 1930s highlighted the difficulties of 
broadening leadership beyond a small coterie of dedicated 
activists and overcoming concerted opposition from 
employers.  Hence, whilst the Federation of Non-European 
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Trade Unions of the 1930s, and its successor, the Council 
of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU), proved somewhat more 
stable, they never succeeded in establishing a meaningful 
presence beyond a handful of workplaces (c.f. Simons and 
Simons 1969).  The politically more pragmatic South African 
Trades and Labour Council provided a brief and fragile 
umbrella for all unions in South Africa, white and black, 
but split apart in 1947 on racial issues (Lewis 1984: 1).  
The formation in 1955 of the South African Congress of 
Trade Unions brought together the remnants of the CNETU 
unions, some of the more progressive former SATLC unions, 
and a few small unaffiliated unions. As such, it 
represented an attempt to revitalize the idea of non-racial 
trade unionism, but, had a very narrow base in the 
factories, and was over-reliant on leadership.  Again, it 
highlighted the limitations of national level campaigning 
at the expense of factory level organization, the 
challenges of broadening leadership, and the difficulties 
in overcoming concerted state and employer resistance 
(Lambert 1988; Feit 1975).  In the early 1960s, it was 
forced into exile by the apartheid government (Lambert 
1988; Feit 1975).  This left African workers largely 
unorganized, with most organized white, coloured and Indian 
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workers being divided between unions that were bureaucratic 
and quiescent and those that were fiercely racist.   
   
In the early 1970s, a number of new independent worker 
service organizations sprung up, run by a combination of 
academics, students and former trade union officials; these 
soon developed into trade unions focusing their attentions 
on the largely unorganized African majority (Maree 1987: 
3).  In attempting to remobilize workers, these activists 
were informed by the experience of previous organizational 
failures: hence, a strong premium was placed on shopfloor 
organization and democracy, as a means of overcoming the 
problems that earlier unions faced with over-centralization 
and in linking national concerns with the day to day 
grievances of workers (Maree 1987: 3; Friedman 1987: 87-
90).  The shopfloor democracy practiced in the 1970s was 
different to its present manifestation in that shopstewards 
then had no legal protection, and, hence could be readily 
victimized by employers (and indeed, could face arrest and 
detention without trial by the authorities). In turn, this 
meant that organizational structures were kept as flat as 
possible (to avoid the easy elimination of a small strata 
of leaders), with strong a emphasis being placed on worker 
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education to train future leaders (Cooper 1995; Ruskin 
College 1972). 
 
These unions could be divided into three broad strands. 
Firstly, there were those unions that were particularly 
orientated to shopfloor issues and were cautious in dealing 
with national political issues (the ‘workerist’ unions) 
(Maree 1986). Secondly, there were unions which focused 
specifically on organizing black workers (‘black 
consciousness’ unions). Thirdly, ‘populist’ unions drew in 
members by linking workplace injustices with wider 
political campaigns against apartheid, increasingly in line 
with the political tradition of the then exiled ANC.  By 
the early 1980s, limitations with all these approaches came 
apparent. The ‘workerist’ unions proved best-equipped to 
deal with state repression and employer resistance, but 
they were not immune to arbitrary action by the 
authorities, and faced growing pressures by members to 
articulate their political concerns (Maree 1986; Friedman 
1987; Baskin 1991). The revival of the ANC’s non-racial 
agenda in the early 1980s eclipsed the ‘black 
consciousness’ movement, leaving most unions in this 
tradition with a choice between marginalization or shifting 
to one of the two other alternatives (ibid.).  Finally, 
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whilst the ‘populist’ unions accurately reflected the 
political sentiments of rank and file, a neglect of factory 
organizing made them particularly vulnerable to state 
repression (c.f. Roux 1984). All this put the different 
strands of unionism in a mood for compromise, making for a 
unionism that emphasized both grassroots democracy and a 
need to engage with wider political issues (Friedman 1987).  
Hence, most of the unions in these traditions banded 
together to form COSATU in 1985 (Baskin 1991: 66-67; COSATU 
1985: 43-44).  The independent unions recorded an impressive 
growth through most of the 1970s and 1980s, despite 
occasional setbacks, most notably as a result of the post 
Soweto uprising (1976) wave of repression, and the defeat 
of the 1987 miners’ strike (Baskin 1991: 224-240; c.f. 
Markham and Mothibeli 1987: 58-95).   COSATU unions rapidly 
penetrated the public sector in the late 1980s and 1990s, 
and have retained impressive penetration rates in large 
areas of the service and manufacturing sectors, despite the 
shock of large scale job losses in the latter following the 
scaling back of protective tariffs in the early 1990s.   
 
Figure 1 provides details on changes in union densityii: it 
can be seen that, despite significant drops in some areas 
such as transport, union density rates in COSATU’s 
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heartlands – mining, manufacturing and services – remain 
high, and indeed, appear to have stabilized in the former 
two areas after, in the case of manufacturing, some years 
of decline.  However, overall union membership has dropped 
in mining: by some 15% since 2001 (NALEDI 2006).  
 
Figure 1: Trade Union Density in South Africa 
{* insert figure 1 about here} 
 
Within COSATU, there are 21 unions, with an overall 
membership of 1.8 million (c.f. COSATU 2007). In addition 
to broad industrial unions spanning the above sectors, it 
has some very small affiliates, covering areas diverse as 
football players and actors; the medical doctor’s 
professional association, the South African Medical 
Association (SAMA) is also a COSATU affiliate. Some 30% of 
COSATU’s members are women, although they are under-
represented in leadership (NALEDI 2006: 40).  Only 15% of 
COSATU members are below 35, reflecting high levels of 
youth unemployment; 70% of members are Africans (ibid.:40). 
 
The Legal Context 
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As noted earlier, as early as the 1920s, South African 
labour law made provision for centralized collective 
bargaining; however, Africans were excluded up until 1979 
(Friedman 1987: 149-179).  Faced by the challenge of the 
independent unions, and the increasing costliness of an 
arbitrary racial division of labour, the then apartheid 
government attempted to deracialize a large component of 
the legislation governing industrial relations (see Wiehahn 
Commission 1979). Under the Wiehahn reformsiii, embodied in 
the 1979 Industrial Conciliation (Amendment) Act and the 
1981 Labour Relations Act, trade unions with black workers 
were for the first time allowed to register and participate 
in the industry-wide bargaining structures (Thompson 1989). 
The establishment of an Industrial Court provided a forum 
for arbitrating industrial disputes; a subsequent series of 
progressive court decisions confirmed, inter alia, the 
right to strike and the duty of employers to bargain with 
representative trade unions (Thompson 1989).  An initial 
reluctance of the unions to register, and hence participate 
in official bargaining structures, was soon abandoned, as 
it came clear that the benefits – in terms of entrenching 
the role of the unions in individual workplaces and 
securing bargaining rights – outweighed the risks from 
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participating in official structures during the apartheid 
era (Baskin 1991; Friedman 1987).  
 
Meanwhile, the apartheid government’s hopes of draining 
away factory level militancy through opening up centralized 
bargaining, in the same manner as the 1924 reforms did for 
white unions, proved unrealistic (c.f. Jouvelis 1982).  The 
reasons for this were simple: whilst after 1924 white 
workers could further the interests of their members 
through supporting specific political parties, and 
championing racial job reservation, in the 1980s, blacks 
continued to be denied meaningful political rights, whilst 
widespread petty workplace racism underscored the link 
between political and workplace injustice (Webster 1987). 
Quite simply, the government failed to politically 
incorporate the unions (Webster 1987).  Members’ shared 
experience of collective injustice and internal democracy 
impelled union leadership towards more explicitly promoting 
socio-political change (Hirschsohn 2001: 442; Webster 
1987).  Heavy handed police repression in efforts to put 
down mass strikes in the mines, post office and railways 
further alienated the unions, as did an attempt to limit 
the scope the Industrial Court and to make the unions 
liable for punitive damages in the event of secondary 
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strike action through the Labour Relations Amendment Act 
(no. 83) of 1988.  The temporary incapacitation and forced 
resignation of the hardline PW Botha in an internal power 
struggle within the ruling National Party led to the more 
pragmatic FW De Klerk becoming President.  Goaded by a severe 
economic crisis, and the fact that covert talks with the 
exiled African National Congress (ANC) had revealed that a 
political settlement was possible, De Klerk unbanned the ANC, 
its junior partner, the South African Communist Party (SACP) 
and a plethora of other organizations, and initiated a 
process of national negotiations. 
 
This, in turn, led to COSATU entering into a formal 
Alliance with the ANC and the SACP.  The National Party 
underestimated the Alliance as a negotiating partner: 
events such as the collapse of the bantustans impelled 
major concessions, leading to a political settlement, with 
democratic elections being held in 1994.  Meanwhile, COSATU 
entered into talks of its own with employers and other 
stakeholders to reverse the 1988 Act, and agree on a new 
labour relations act that would have greater legitimacy: 
this led to the 1995 Labour Relations Act (LRA).  COSATU 
was happy to back up its demands at both these sets of 
negotiations with nationwide community and workplace 
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protests: hence, COSATU followed a strategy of strategic 
engagement with the continued use of collective action 
(Hirschohn 2001: 444).  
 
This engagement continues to operate at two levels, in 
addition to workplace and industrial level collective 
bargaining. Firstly, at the national political level, the 
Alliance persists between the unions and its political 
partners: it gives COSATU unions representation at ANC 
Congresses and the opportunity to nominate a proportion of 
the ANC’s parliamentary candidates list (McKinley 2002). 
Secondly, the National Economic, Development, and Labour 
Advisory Council (NEDLAC), was established in 1995; this 
provides a forum for negotiation between business, state, 
and unions.  Although it was intended that this body play a 
broadly corporatist role, it has failed to live up to 
expectations in recent years; the attendance of key players 
at NEDLAC meetings has tailed off (Mail and Guardian 
29/5/2005). This probably is due to the fact that robust 
economic growth and political stability have reduced the 
need for major compromises by business and the state 
(Harcourt and Wood 2002; c.f. Naidoo 2003).  This process 
of engagement with employers and political parties has not 
led to an institutionalized process of regular dialogue, 
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negotiation and deal making as is commonly associated with 
corporatist countries: agreements between state, labour and 
unions remain ad hoc and episodic, with many new government 
policies simply being imposed (Nedlac 2006: 5; c.f. 
Harcourt and Wood 2002; McKinley 2002). In turn, this makes 
the potential for the unions to impact directly on 
government policy via the Alliance even more important. 
  
Crisis and Decline? 
 
Current debates on the tactics and effectiveness of the 
independent unions centre on three broad areas. Firstly, 
there is the advisability of the tripartite alliance per 
seiv (Habib and Taylor 1999; Barchiesi and Bramble 2003; 
McKinley 2002; Von Holdt 2002; Buhlungu 2006b; Hlatswayo 
2005). Secondly, there is the durability of shopfloor 
democracy given inevitable oligarchic tendencies, and the 
day-to-day compromises made by shopfloor leadership 
(Ratchleff 2001: 156-157; Barchiesi and Bramble 2003; 
Hlatswayo 2005; Cooper 2005). Many of the critics of the 
Alliance directly link it to an apparent crisis of 
shopfloor democracy (Barchiesi and Bramble 2003;; Hlatswayo 
2005; Rachleff 2001; Habib and Taylor 1999; McKinley 2002).   
A third area concern, the federation’s inability to make 
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headway in areas other than among full time permanent 
employees in the formal sector (Buhlungu 2006b: 9; Webster 
2006: 38), is beyond the scope of this article.  However, 
it should be noted that formal employment constitutes a 
diminishing proportion of the South African labour market. 
Moreover, wholesale job shedding in the private sector 
following on the cutting back of protective tariffs has 
greatly reduced the pool of potential union members, and 
caused drops in overall union membership levels in many 
areas (Webster 2006: 21-23).   
 
The Crisis of the Alliance? 
South African labour legislation is highly progressive, 
making provision for centralized bargaining, and a system 
of dispute resolution that enjoys a high degree of 
legitimacy. The centerpiece of South African labour 
legislation is the 1995 LRA, which extended existing labour 
legislation; it retained industry specific Bargaining 
Councils, a system of mediation-centered dispute resolution 
(via the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration {CCMA}), and a works council system (known as 
workplace forums), albeit that the latter only had limited 
impact (Wood and Mahabir 2001).   Progressive features of 
the system include organizational and bargaining rights for 
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unions (including legal recognition of the role of the shop 
steward), and rights to adjudication via the Labour Court 
(which, in turn, has further expanded worker rights via 
case law).  It is worth noting the COSATU ranks 
promulgation of the LRA as amongst its greatest 
achievements (COSATU 2007). The CCMA has dealt with 400 000 
cases since its inception, handling an average of 414 cases 
per day (South Africa Info 2007).  Not only does COSATU 
fully support the Bargaining Council system, but favours 
its extension to sectors that are not covered by them (Vavi 
2007). Finally, the Labour Court has expanded worker rights 
through case law.   
 
The system incorporates strong elements of voluntarism – 
inter alia, the maintainence of centralized bargaining in a 
specific industry is contingent on the support of the 
principal unions and employer associations - and has had 
little effect on employers in the small business and 
informal sectors (Appollis 1995: 48). More generally-
speaking, employers retain a relatively free hand to make 
redundancies.  However, despite pressures from conservative 
sections of business and the opposition Democratic 
Alliance, the ANC has resisted demands for radical labour 
market deregulation. Indeed, earlier a number of loopholes 
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in the 1995 Labour Relations Act, which, inter alia, 
allowed employers to escape the Act’s provisions by 
classing workers as independent contractors (see Donnelly 
and Dunn 2006) have now been closed.  Again, the process of 
privatization has been cautious and incremental – in part 
due to the problems experienced in attempting to privatize 
the telecommunications utility, Telkom, but also due to 
sustained union opposition - in sharp contrast to the 
radical measures introduced in many other emerging markets 
(Southall 2007: 214; Buhlungu 2004: 1-27).  Both the 
maintainence – and expansion – of progressive labour 
legislation and the restraints on privatization represent, 
at least in part, the efforts of the ANC’s alliance 
partners (Southall 2007: 215; Buhlungu 2004; Buhlungu 
2006).  
 
However, the Alliance has not brought benefits to the 
unions in other areas (Habib and Taylor 1999). Following on 
the ANC’s victory in the 1994, it replaced its neo-Keynsian 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in favour of 
the more-overtly neo-liberal Growth, Employment and 
Restribution (GEAR) policy (Burawoy 2004).  Reforms include 
the phasing out of protective tariffs, a less active 
industrial policy, and the introduction of New Public 
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Management practices in the public sector. Finally, despite 
impressive GDP growth figures (up to 5% in recent years), 
unemployment remains extremely high (some estimates place 
it at over 40%) (EIU 2007); the ANC’s inability to make 
serious progress on the latter front remains an abiding 
challenge and (see Donnelly and Dunn 2006) and a residual 
source of tension with union leaders and community based 
grassroots organizations (Desai 2002).   
 
What threatened to be a major showdown between the unions 
and the ANC, a major public sector strike over wages and 
working conditions in June 2007 ended, after protracted 
talks, in the unions accepting the government’s final 7.5% 
pay offer (Business Day 21/6/2007).  COSATU General 
Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi  summed up the unions’ position 
as: ‘…no strike has ever been entirely successful…it is the 
view of (Cosatu’s) national office bearers that the draft 
agreement in its totality represents some progress and 
gains’ (quoted in ibid.). 
 
This experience underscored both the challenges the unions 
faced in sustaining large scale collective action, but also 
demonstrated the unwillingness – and, perhaps, inability – 
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of the ANC to firmly break with the unions. Interestingly, 
the strike also involved several non-COSATU white-dominated 
unions, perhaps a harbinger of an emerging non-racial class 
solidarity.   
 
The unions were instrumental in the non-reelection of Thabo 
Mbeki as ANC leader (but not national President) in 2007, 
primarily on account of his poor performance on the job 
creation front, his open espousal of neo-liberal policy 
solutions, and his handling of the Aids issue. However, his 
replacement, Jacob Zuma, has made many promises to 
different constituencies, including business (Mail and 
Guardian 14/12/2007); there is little reason to believe 
that he will be any more labour friendly than his 
predecessor, demonstrating both the paucity of leadership 
alternatives at national political level and the extent to 
which the unions remain wedded to the existing Alliance. 
 
The Crisis of Shopfloor Democracy? 
A second critique leveled against COSATU is that strong 
oligarchic tendencies have emasculated the internal 
participatory democracy within its affiliates (Hlatswayo 
2005; Rachleff 2002).  
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Management are under increasing pressure – inter alia, in 
terms of Employment Equityv legislation – to be seen to be 
advancing blacks into management; meanwhile the ending of 
apartheid has opened up new careers in government and the 
public sector.  Both these phenomena have created a serious 
‘brain drain’, with the position of shop steward becoming a 
good stepping stone to management or government (c.f. 
Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu 2007: 246; Ndala 2002: 76).  In 
sectors such as mining, the position of a full-time shop 
(shaft) steward is not only a route into management, but 
also a well paid position in its own right: this serves as 
a residual source of tension for those left behind 
(Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu 2007: 251).  More broadly 
speaking, there many former part time positions in the 
labour movement are now full time and paid, changing the 
ethos of serving the union (Roskam 2002: 10-11).  Less 
attention is paid to ‘learning by organizing and struggle’ 
worker education than in the 1970s, with union educational 
efforts being more directed to human resource development, 
with an underlying ethos promoting a ‘competitive 
individualism…depoliticized and stripped of its class 
identity’ (Cooper 2005: 2; c.f. Hlatswayo 2005: 16-18).  
However, there is no accurate numerical information as to 
the precise extent of the ‘brain drain’, or of the effects 
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of changes in worker education, and their consequences have 
been contested by union sources (c.f. COSATU 2000; Mabyana 
1999). 
 
Secondly, many COSATU unions have had to contend with 
internal struggles.  In the 2000 Volkswagen and 2001 Engen 
strikes, workers challenged agreements made between the 
leadership of the union and management, electing new shop 
stewards to represent the rank-and-file better (Hlatswayo 
2005: 17; Rachleff 2001: 165; Desai 2000).   Whilst the 
Volkswagen strike led to a defeat for rebel union members, 
in other sectors, radical breakaway unions have emerged, 
such as the Oil, Gas, and Chemical Workers Union.  It has 
been argued that shopfloor structures for democracy and 
recall have become so unresponsive that the only meaningful 
option is exit (Rachleff 2001: 166; Desai 2000; Hlatswayo 
2005).  Others have pointed to deep cleavages amongst 
members, inter alia on gender lines, and between urban 
dwellers and migrant workers (Von Holdt 2002; 2003).  
Again, Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu (2007: 246-251) point to 
the extent to which new opportunities for upward mobility 
have eroded internal solidarity in the labour movement.  
Hence, it has been argued that at a time when unions have 
the greatest potential to impact on society, their internal 
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organizational democracy been challenged (Bezuidenhout and 
Buhlungu 2007: 246-251).    
 
Statement of Hypotheses 
 
Given the above, two ‘pessimistic’ hypotheses are derived: 
 
Hypothesis 1 
 
Worker participation in shopfloor democracy is low, and 
with inadequate structures for accountability and recall. 
 
And 
 
Hypothesis 2 
 
Most COSATU members have reservations regarding the 
tripartite alliance in general and the ANC in particular. 
 
Method 
 
The Taking Democracy Seriously surveys represent the only 
regularly conducted and nationwide surveys of members of 
what is by far South Africa’s largest and most effective 
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union federation, COSATU. Previous surveys were conducted 
in 1994 (see Ginsburg et al. 1995) and 1998 (see Wood and 
Psoulis 2001); the survey that forms the basis of this 
article was conducted in 2004 (see Buhlungu 2006b: 1-4). A 
full discussion of the history of these surveys, and 
further details on the survey methodology may be found in 
Buhlungu (2006b).  The 1994 survey revealed high levels of 
internal democracy both within long-standing affiliates in 
the manufacturing and mining sector and more recent 
affiliates in the public sector, and a solidification of 
political support behind the ANC in the run-up to South 
Africa’s first ever democratic elections (Ginsburg et al. 
1995). The 1998 survey revealed the persistence of both 
internal democracy and existing political loyalties in the 
immediate post-transition period (Wood and Psoulis 2001).   
 
As with the previous surveys, the 2004 survey focused on 
members of COSATU countrywide. In all, 655 union members 
were interviewed in 2004 (see Buhlungu 2004: 4).  However, 
the 2004 encompassed very much large numbers of public 
sector workers (35% of the sample) reflecting the expansion 
of the unions into this area (Buhlungu 2004: 4).  Other 
sectors covered included mining (7.8%), manufacturing 
16.5%), catering and retail (8.3%), transport and 
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communication (2.2%), chemicals (1.7%), clothing and 
textiles (13.3%), food (4.4%), and banking (0.5%).  
 
 The support of COSATU nationally was obtained, and this 
information communicated to COSATU affiliates’ regional 
offices. Interviews were conducted at workplace level.  
Area sampling was used. Firstly, this was done at the level 
of five geographical regions (the country’s five principal 
provinces, where most of the population and industry are 
located). Secondly, within these areas, individual 
unionized workplaces were randomly selected, within 
specific sectors (see Wood and Psoulis 2001: 299-301; 
Buhlungu 2006b: 4). In 1994, a list of organizations was 
compiled from directory information supplied by Telkom, the 
South African parastatal telecommunications utility, on 
sectoral lines; this listing of firms was updated in 1998 
and 2004, to take account of entries and exits (Telkom make 
available electronically {in 1994 this was on floppy disks} 
listings of firms compiled for directory purposes). This 
listing would exclude very small businesses in the informal 
sector that lacked telephones; at the same time, such 
businesses would be most unlikely to have a union presence 
at all.  Companies were then randomly selected within each 
sector, and contacted to see if they were unionized by a 
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COSATU affiliate; where this was not the case, they were 
discarded and substituted by another randomly selected 
organization, and the same check performed. 
 
Employers were then consulted to organize access to the 
workplace. The final level of sampling was done at 
individual workplace level, on a systematic basis, with the 
number of workers selected being proportional to workplace 
size. As we did not have access to accurate union 
membership lists, systematic selection of respondents 
enabled us to compile the sample during the interview 
process (Bailey 1982: 93-94).  Almost all workers 
approached indicated that they were happy to be 
interviewed; the high degree of homogeneity of views of 
respondents in individual workplaces helped ensure the 
representivity of the sample.  However, it is recognized 
that, as the survey depended on the goodwill of management 
and union leaders, it is possible that workers who were 
consistently hostile to both could have been excluded from 
the survey. 
 
The multi-layered nature of the survey methodology may be 
difficult to justify on strictly technical grounds: 
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however, it represented the most feasible option under the 
circumstances (Wood and Psoulis 2001). 
 
It was not possible for the 1994, 1998 and 2004 surveys to 
constitute a panel study owing to the large numbers of 
redundancies, and, indeed, the high exit rate of firms in a 
number of industries, such as textiles, where the dropping 
of protective tariffs has proved severely detrimental; the 
problem of ‘panel mortality’ would have proven 
insurmountable (Bailey 1982: 110).   Instead, the 
consecutive surveys constitute trend studies (Babbie 1995: 
96; Bailey 1982: 110).   It is recognized that trend 
studies do have limitations, in that it is not possible to 
compensate for the consequences of different sets of 
workplace dynamics in different workplaces selected over 
time. However, a chi-squared analysis of the effects of 
changes over time revealed in most areas, changes in worker 
attitudes and were slight (only a few percentage points), 
and can probably be ascribed to sampling errors (see 
Buhlungu 2006a: 227-248); at the same time, the high degree 
of similarity in responses in most areas over time would 
seem to vindicate the sampling process.  More significant 
changes occurred in a small number of areasvi.  Appendix 1 
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provides a breakdown of the age race, gender and skill 
composition of the 2004 sample.   
 
Measuring Participatory Democracy in Unions 
 
As Morris and Fosh (2000: 96) notes, there are four 
alternative perspectives on participatory democracy in 
unions.  Firstly, there are Liberal Pluralist approaches.  
These suggest that the extent of participatory democracy 
reflects whether or not a union has a democratic 
constitution (all COSATU unions have to, as a condition of 
affiliation), voting mechanisms (Stepan-Norris 1997: 476-
477), the degree of membership participation in elections 
(Morris and Fosh 2000: 96), and/or meetings in general 
(Seidman 1953: 222).  Parks et al (1995: 536) argue that a 
temporal dimension is necessary (e.g. when last did a 
member participate in an election or attend a meeting).   
 
Lipset (1952: 61) argues that members are likely to be able 
to impact on union policy when there are clear alternative 
positions and camps within a particular union that members 
may choose to opt for: institutionalized opposition 
‘permits a degree of direct membership influence on 
organization policy through their ability to overturn a 
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union government’ (Lipset 1952: 61; a similar point is made 
by Taft 1944: 248).  In turn, this may be reflect by 
whether, how often, and how closely elections are contested 
(Stepan-Norris 1997: 477- 480; Seidman 1953: 223). 
 
A second viewpoint, the Consumer Trade Union one considers 
members as consumers of union services (Morris and Fosh 
2000:97).  Members need not be involved in decisions for it 
to be democratic, as long as leaders know what members 
want. Where membership is voluntary, it may be assessed as 
to how successful it is in getting or retaining them 
(Morris and Fosh 2000: 97).  As can be seen from figure 1, 
most COSATU unions have been highly effective in recruiting 
and retaining members through most of the 1990s and 2000s. 
However, most accounts would suggest that active 
participation is a behavioural manifestation of union 
commitment, rather than membership retention per se (Parks 
et al. 1995: 535). 
 
Thirdly, Grassroots Activism approaches look at how active 
members are in decision making, in seeking to actively 
control their officials and delegates, and in participating 
in union affairs (Morris and Fosh 2000: 97; Fairbrother 
1983: 24); in other words, the extent to which rank and 
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file actively seek to directly determine policy (Seidman 
1957: 35).   
 
Finally, as Morris and Fosh (2000: 98) note, conservative 
individual accountability views hold that the rank and file 
are inevitably more moderate than leaders (Morris and Fosh 
2000: 98); a lack of interest in union affair may mask 
climate of intimidation (Taft 1944: 251). Hence, the degree 
of democracy is dependent on mechanisms such as secret 
ballots (Morris and Fosh 2000: 98). 
 
These categories are not exclusive: there is much overlap 
between them, and through taking account of these different 
perspectives, it is possible to develop a composite measure 
of participatory union democracy (Morris and Fosh 2000: 
112-113).  Key issues emerging from the above include 
levels of attendance at union meetings, the regularity of 
elections, the degree of membership participation in 
elections, the use of secret ballots, and grassroots 
demands for accountability and recall. 
 
A Mokken scale was estimated using each individual’s 
responses to these 9 key questions as follows: 
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Item 1 Is there a shop steward in the workplace? 
Item 2 Are shop stewards elected by the workers? 
Item 3 Are they elected at least annually? 
Item 4 Have you actually voted in an election within last 
2 years? 
Item 5 Is the election by secret ballot? 
Item 6  Do you expect that shop stewards must consult with 
workers on all, or at least important, issues? 
Item 7 Do you expect that shop stewards must report back 
to workers? 
Item 8 Do you believe that you have the right to remove 
shop stewards if they do not do what the workers want? 
Item 9 Do you attend union meetings at least on a monthly 
basis? 
 
This scale is constructed using Mokken’s non-parametric 
model for one dimensional cumulative scaling (Sijtsma and 
Molenaar 2002). A Mokken scale is used since the majority 
of the questions have dichotomous responses. The other 
items have a range of responses dependent upon the 
frequency of that particular event. Unfortunately it is 
impossible to include both types of responses within a 
consistent scale, hence the remaining items are reduced to 
binary responses and a Mokken scale adopted. This generates 
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a scale ranging from 100 for those respondents recording 
‘yes’ for all nine items, zero for those recording all ‘no’ 
answers and a position somewhere in between for the vast 
majority of respondents with a mix of answers. Their 
relative position in the scale is then determined by their 
number of positive responses and the relative scarcity of 
positive responses to each of those survey questions, 
(Gooderham et al 2006). Therefore each respondent is placed 
in the scale on the basis of whether they have shop 
stewards in their workplace, how the shop steward gained 
their position and how long for, how the respondent expects 
the shop steward to discharge his/her responsibilities, as 
well as whether the individual respondent regularly attends 
union meetings. There are other aspects of participatory 
democracy, for example having access to union materials and 
literature, and informal open ended participation in union 
related issues (Parks et al. 1995: 536), as well as being 
able to act on that information, but unfortunately there 
were no questions relating to this in the surveyvii. 
 
Once the scale was calculated, it was then used as the 
dependent variable and a regression model estimated using 
ordinary least squares on a vector of explanatory variables 
covering union, gender, age, province, occupational status, 
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security of tenure, education and mother tongue. Of these 
the only continuous variable is age, all of the other 
categories are controlled for using a set of dummy 
variables, with each one recorded below in Table 1. For 
each group the reference category is highlighted in bold 
type. 
 
{* insert table 1 about here} 
It needs to be noted that the union variables also act as a 
proxy for industrial sector, since the COSATU policy of 
promoting industry unions means that membership of most of 
these unions implies working in a particular industry. 
 
In order to formally test the second hypothesis, i.e. gauge 
the level of support for the tripatite alliance and the ANC 
respectively, a similar method is adopted. Firstly, a 
Mokken scale of support for the alliance is constructed 
using the following terms; 
 
 Item 1  Should COSATU and its affiliates send 
representatives to the national parliament? 
 Item 2  Should COSATU and its affiliates send 
representatives to the provincial parliament? 
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 Item 3  Should COSATU and its affiliates send 
representatives to local government? 
 Item 4 COSATU has entered into an alliance with 
the ANC and the SACP to contest the 2004 elections. Do you 
think it is the best way of serving workers' interests? 
 Item 5 Do you think the alliance should continue 
for future elections beyond 2004? 
 Item 6 Are you going to vote for the ANC in the 
forthcoming (2004) national elections? 
 
Secondly a similar scale is created for ANC support using 
these items; 
 
 Item 1 Are you going to vote for the ANC in the 
forthcoming (2004) national elections? 
 Item 2 Are you going to vote for the ANC in the 
forthcoming (2004) provincial elections? 
 Item 3 Do you think that the alliance, at least 
with the ANC should continue for future elections beyond 
2004? 
 
The resultant scales are then used as the dependent 
variables in OLS regressions on the same explanatory 
variables as the earlier model, thus they are estimated as 
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a function of union, gender, age, province, occupation, 
security of tenure, education and mother tongue.   Appendix 
2 gives the survey questions utilized and responses.   
 
Findings  
 
The results from estimating a Mokken scale of empowerment are 
recorded below in Table 2. The first test of the validity of 
the scale is Loevinger’s H-coefficient of homogeneity, 
(Hwgt), which is recorded for each individual item as well as 
for the overall scale. The minimum acceptance criterion is an 
H-value of at least 0.3 (Sijtsma and Molenaar, 2002). In the 
initial estimation of the scale item 5, election by secret 
ballot, falls below this criterion, hence this item is 
omitted and the scale re-estimated. Once this is done all of 
the remaining items satisfy this and the H-value for the 
overall scale of 0.42 indicates that the scale is robust in 
terms of scalability. It is also important to test for the 
reliability of the indicators; as the Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.82 is comfortably above the standard minimum of 0.7, there 
is no reason to doubt the reliability of the scale (Sijtsma 
and Molenaar, 2002). 
 
{* insert table 2 about here} 
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 Table 3 records the results from estimating the second 
scale measuring the level of support for the COSATU, ANC 
and SACP alliance. This comfortably satisfies both the 
scalability and reliability criteria: hence the scale can 
be accepted as a valid measure. It is interesting to note 
that there is very strong support for the alliance by union 
members with in the region of 2/3rds of the respondents 
believing that the alliance should continue and that it 
best serves their interests. 
 
{* insert table 3 about here} 
Finally, Table 4 reports the results from estimating the 
support for the ANC scale and once again this satisfies the 
scalability and reliability criteria. There are also 
indicators of strong support for the ANC within union 
members, 2/3rds intending to vote for the ANC at national 
level, with even more intending to at the provincial level 
and supporting a continuing alliance at least with the ANC. 
 
{* insert table 4 about here} 
As all three scales are acceptable in terms of scalability 
and reliability they are included as dependent variables 
and the three models are estimated as outlined in the 
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previous section. The results from estimating these 
regression models using ordinary least squares are 
reproduced below in Table 5. 
 
{* insert table 5 about here} 
As the explanatory variables are the same in each case the 
results from all 3 models are included in Table 5. The 
coefficients and t-ratios are recorded firstly for the 
participatory democracy model, then for the alliance scale 
model and finally for the ANC scale model. The final column 
reports the means of the explanatory variables. In all 
three cases the reference category is a Xhosa speaking 
skilled male NUMSA member in Gauteng with a permanent full-
time contract and educated up to Std 9-10. 
 
The results suggest that to a large extent the level of 
participatory democracy for COSATU members is unaffected by 
the explanatory variables, with only 14% of the variation 
in the scale being explained by these variables. Generally, 
levels of participation in union affairs remain high, with 
70% of respondents attending union meetings at least 
monthly and over 90% believing that their union 
representatives must consult the members. Why is 
participation in union affairs so high? The most likely 
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explanation would be the ‘virtuous circle’ one: people are 
more likely to participate if they feel their input has 
impact, and that structures for the election of 
representatives, and avenues for their recall are 
functional, and less so if this is not the case (Burnell 
2003b: 13-18). This does not mean that internal democracy 
can be taken for granted; indeed, research conducted at 
community level in South Africa has highlighted a 
propensity for individuals to retain a belief in 
participative democracy, whilst becoming increasingly 
disillusioned with their elected representatives and their 
structures, opening the way for ‘growing cynicism and 
political demobilization’ (Southall 2003: 151). 
 
In terms of the different categories of variable, firstly, 
being in a different union is relatively unimportant with 
only CWU (Communication Workers' Union), SATAWU (South 
African Transport and Allied Workers' Union) and POPCRU 
(Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union) reaching any level 
of significance. All of these unions having significantly 
higher levels of participatory democracy when compared to 
the NUMSA base group.   
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Province is also largely unimportant with only members in 
KZN experiencing levels of participatory democracy below 
those of other provinces; this echoes the findings of 
earlier surveys, and could reflect the difficulties the 
unions have encountered in the face of sustained hostility 
by the conservative Inkhatha Freedom Party (although those 
within the union movement in that province remained 
overwhelmingly supportive of the Alliance). Thirdly, age, 
mother tongue and gender are generally insignificant, 
indicating they are largely irrelevant to the level of 
participatory democracy. Occupation also has very little 
impact upon the extent of participation in union affairs 
with only clerical workers being significantly different 
from the skilled worker base group and experiencing less 
democracy in the workplace.  
 
Fourthly, tenure has very little impact, although fixed 
term full-time is negative and significant and permanent 
part-time is positive and significant, these only cover 
about 7% of the sample with the vast majority being on 
permanent full-time contracts. Finally education becomes 
important for those at the highest levels, with those 
holding technical diplomas or university degrees being 
likely to be employed within a more democratic environment. 
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Whilst members of COSATU affiliates are mostly semi-skilled 
or skilled workers, they do have significant pockets of 
support amongst workers with tertiary education in finance, 
transport and medicine: shopfloor democracy in such sectors 
is relatively new, as it is amongst highly skilled workers 
in general in South Africa; it is a relatively under-
investigated phenomenon, and deserves closer examination in 
future. 
 
Admittedly some of the participatory democracy scale is 
either subjective or reflects factors that the individual 
member is unable to influence. Consequently it is plausible 
that Item 4, voting in shop steward elections, and item 9, 
regularly attending union meetings, are much stronger 
indicators of commitment to the union since it requires the 
member to carry out a particular action. In response to 
this possibility the empirical analysis was repeated, this 
time using Item 4 and Item 9 individually and respectively 
as the dependent variable in the model. The findings were 
entirely consistent with those from the participatory 
democracy scale model; strong levels of commitment are 
shown across the board with hardly any of the control 
variables having a significant impact. 
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There is fairly broad satisfaction with the alliance, as 
reported in Table 3 almost 2/3rds of respondents express 
clear support for the alliance and their wish for it to 
continue. Turning to the regression results, again the 
explanatory variables are relatively unimportant, with the 
level of support being largely unaffected by age, gender, 
province, occupation, tenure and education. What is 
significant though is that the level of support is even 
higher amongst NEHAWU (National Health and Allied Workers 
Union) and NUM (National Union of Mineworkers) members. The 
NUM in particular has traditionally been amongst the 
strongest proponents of the alliance and this is confirmed 
here. In addition the level of support for the alliance is 
significantly lower amongst Afrikaans speakers and, in 
particular, English speakers; this would reflect the very 
much lower support for the ANC-Alliance among South 
Africa’s non-African population. 
 
Finally, turning to the analysis of support for the ANC, 
Table 4 has already revealed that there is strong and solid 
support present. The regression results indicate that the 
level of support is consistent across, province, tenure and 
education. However the ANC does have lower levels of 
support amongst women, English speakers and Afrikaans 
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speakers, the latter two being consistent with the level of 
support for the alliance highlighted earlier. At the same 
time the level of support is significantly higher amongst 
semi-skilled workers, SACTWU (South African Clothing and 
Textile Workers' Union), NEHAWU and NUM members, once again 
the last two concur with the level of support shown for the 
alliance. 
 
The survey revealed both the persistence of high levels of 
participation in union life, and loyalty to the ANC-
Alliance. As Morris and Fosh (2000:111: 112) note, 
effective participatory democracy is a complex phenomenon, 
encompassing involvement in union affairs and elections, 
regularity of elections and electoral procedures, and an 
active desire by members to be involved in decision making 
and policy setting, and through holding their 
representatives to account. It is likely that at least part 
of the success of the COSATU unions in retaining a large 
numerical following can be ascribed to their ability to 
combine these features in a manner that would be conducive 
to encouraging future participation and involvement in 
union affairs (c.f. Hammer and Wazeter 1993: 302; Burnell 
2003b: 13-18; Kelly and Heery 1994).  Democratic 
constitutions and secret ballots can make participation 
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more meaningful; high levels of attendance at union 
meetings and regular elections make for frequent 
opportunities to exercise these rights. Exercising these 
rights is, in turn, more meaningful in an environment where 
there are general expectations of grassroots input, 
accountability and recall (c.f. Fairbrother 1983: 24). 
 
Conclusions 
 
The survey revealed that the ANC-Alliance continues to 
enjoy mass support, whilst internal democracy remains 
robust. Based on the survey, we cannot conclude that the 
Alliance has been sustained by disempowering members, or 
that a vibrant culture of internal democracy and recall has 
not persisted (c.f. Bezuidenhout and Buhlungu 2007: 246-
254). But, why is participatory democracy so important for 
determining the future of organized labour in South Africa?  
Especially since other factors, such as the dearth of 
credible political leadership alternatives, the continued 
hegemony of neo-liberalism, stubbornly high unemployment, 
and difficulties in outreach to the informal sector all 
pose long term challenges for unions?   It can be argued 
that grassroots participatory democracy has been central to 
the identity of the independent unions since their 
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inception (Naledi 2006; Baskin 1991; Wood and Psoulis 2001; 
Maree 1986). It is this that enabled them to overcome 
apartheid-era repression, to mobilize mass support behind 
the ANC Alliance in successive elections, and to cope with 
high levels of leadership turnover as positions in 
management and government have opened up to union 
activists. Quite simply, the independent unions would not 
be what they are without grassroots participatory 
democracy: a crisis of the latter would represent a 
discontinuity from an inspiring tradition, and, indeed, 
undermine one of the few mechanisms that has the potential 
to counterbalance the authoritarian tendencies inherent in 
dominant partyism and neo-liberalism.   
 
Can we then conclude that the South African labour movement 
is ‘doing just fine’?  Regretably, the truth is more 
complex.  Firstly, market reforms have weakened the state’s 
ability to actively manage the economy, and have, as noted 
above, resulted in large-scale job shedding, undermining 
the base of union membership (Southall 2003: 148). In South 
Africa, unemployment stands at about 39%, an increase of 
almost 7% since the end of apartheid (Kingdon and Knight 
2006). Not only has the pool of potential union members got 
smaller, but so has the ability of the state to promote 
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social inclusion (c.f. ibid.). In a dominant party system, 
the most realistic option may be working through – and 
within – the ruling party, a realism which appears to be 
shared by most COSATU members.  However, this will 
inevitably result in competition and trade offs with other 
constituencies; a relatively small political leadership 
elite makes for a lack of meaningful alternatives to the 
present, reducing the chance of a radical recasting of 
government policy. Secondly, whilst internal democracy 
within the unions may be relatively vibrant, there are a 
number of challenges to be faced. Traditional activist 
education and training has given way to managerialist HRD 
(Cooper 2005); this will result in changes in the portfolio 
of skills and leadership style of office bearers. Regular 
internal elections may reflect not just a viable democratic 
culture, but the effects of high turnover, making skills 
portfolios of potential leaders critical.  The survey also 
revealed that women were less active in union affairs, 
explaining their under-representation in leadership.   
Again, an ability to retain – and to effectively represent 
existing members – has not been matched by an ability to 
reach out to those in the informal sector, and the jobless 
(c.f. Desai 2002).   
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Figure 1 
 
Trade Union Density by Industrial Sector (No Agriculture or Domestic 
Sectors)
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(Sources - Dibben, Hinks and Wood 2007: 11, computed based 
on October Household Surveys and September Labour Force 
Surveys; Naledi 2006: 40; the authors). 
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Table 1: Dummy Explanatory Variables 
 
 
Variable Categories
Union Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers
Union (CEPPWAWU),  
Communication Workers Union (CWU),
Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU), 
Health Care Union (HOSPERSA),
National Teaching Union (NATU), 
(NEHAWU),
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), 
National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA), 
Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union (POPCRU),
South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers 
Union (SACCAWU),
Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers Union(SACTWU),
South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU),
South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU),
South African Transport and Allied Workers Union (SATAWU)
Gender
Province
Western Cape
Occupational Category
Security of Tenure Fixed term and part-time, Fixed term and full-time, Permanent
Educational Level
Technical diploma, University degree, Other qualification
Mother Tongue
Male, Female
Gauteng, North West Province, KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape
Unskilled, Semi-skilled, Skilled, Supervisor, Clerical
and part-time, Permanent and full-time
No formal education, Std 2 or lower, Std 3-5, Std 6-8, Std 9-10,
IsiZulu, SeSotho, IsiXhosa, IsiNdebele, SePedi, SeTswana,
Tsonga, IsiSwati, Venda, English, Afrikaans
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 Table 2: Participatory Democracy Scale 
 
Mean Corr.
Scale Overall calculative scale, 8 items 0.42 0.3
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.82)
Item 3 Elections at least annually 0.26 0.45 0.23
Item 4 Voted in elections within last 2 years 0.58 0.45 0.4
Item 9 Regularly attend union meetings 0.7 0.31 0.29
Item 7 Shop Stewards must report back 0.79 0.31 0.3
Item 2 Elected Shop Stewards 0.88 0.48 0.47
Item 8 Right to remove Shop Stewards 0.92 0.36 0.32
Item 6 Shop Stewards must consult 0.94 0.61 0.52
Item 1 Shop Stewards in the workplace 0.95 0.59 0.49
H
wgt
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Table 3: Support for Alliance Scale 
 
Mean Corr.
Scale Overall calculative scale, 6 items 0.52 0.35
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.78)
Item 5 Alliance should continue 0.63 0.52 0.52
Item 4 Does alliance best serve workers' interests? 0.64 0.54 0.53
Item 6 Voting for ANC in national elections 0.71 0.4 0.2
Item 2 Should COSATU send reps to the provincial parliament? 0.85 0.56 0.73
Item 3 Should COSATU send reps to the local parliament? 0.85 0.55 0.68
Item 1 Should COSATU send reps to the national parliament? 0.86 0.62 0.71
H
wgt
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Table 4: Support for ANC Scale 
 
Mean Corr.
Scale Overall calculative scale, 3 items 0.65 0.52
(Cronbach's alpha = 0.82)
Item 1 Voting for ANC in national elections 0.67 0.47 0.43
Item 2 Voting for ANC in provincial elections 0.71 0.74 0.83
Item 3 Alliance, at least with the ANC, should continue 0.71 0.74 0.81
H
wgt
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Table 5: OLS Models of Participatory Democracy, Alliance and ANC Support 
Variable T-ratio T-ratio T-ratio Mean
 Constant 50.32*** 7.2 71.56*** 8.7 56.74*** 5.7
 Age 0.10 0.8 -0.03 -0.2 0.21 1.2 38.83
Union
 CEPPWAWU -3.13 -0.6 8.52 1.4 10.30 1.4 0.05
 CWU 16.56*** 3.0 -5.29 -0.8 -1.60 -0.2 0.05
 FAWU 7.81* 1.6 -2.58 -0.4 -9.94 -1.4 0.07
 HOSPERSA 9.78 0.9 -10.02 -0.8 -10.01 -0.7 0.01
 NATU 3.09 0.3 -15.92 -1.2 -21.08 -1.3 0.01
 NEHAWU -3.05 -0.6 17.11*** 3.0 22.87*** 3.3 0.07
 NUM 0.12 0.0 23.64*** 2.5 26.68*** 2.4 0.08
 POPCRU 14.14*** 3.6 2.71 0.6 7.84 1.4 0.13
 SACCAWU 0.12 0.0 11.17* 1.8 12.28* 1.7 0.06
 SACTWU 2.98 0.7 6.98 1.4 14.70*** 2.5 0.12
 SADTU 1.93 0.3 6.87 1.1 7.37 0.9 0.07
 SAMWU 2.82 0.6 6.27 1.1 12.64* 1.9 0.07
 SATAWU 15.70*** 2.5 10.52 1.4 17.32* 1.9 0.03
Gender
 Female -3.58 -1.5 -1.11 -0.4 -7.19** -2.1 0.35
Province
 North West Province 4.34 0.5 -4.98 -0.5 1.39 0.1 0.07
 Kw aZulu-Natal -12.18*** -3.0 -6.78 -1.4 -7.40 -1.3 0.14
 Eastern Cape -2.97 -0.7 2.87 0.6 3.51 0.6 0.20
 Western Cape 1.98 0.5 -0.65 -0.1 0.33 0.1 0.22
Occupation
 Unskilled -2.10 -0.6 2.56 0.6 4.16 0.8 0.13
Semi-skilled 2.86 1.0 4.99 1.5 7.68** 2.0 0.25
Supervisor -1.51 -0.4 0.63 0.1 -0.75 -0.1 0.09
Clerical -9.52*** -2.4 -4.23 -0.9 -6.33 -1.1 0.08
Security of Tenure
Fixed term and part-time -10.89 -1.2 -17.33* -1.7 -19.20 -1.5 0.01
Fixed term and full-time -12.35*** -2.5 3.39 0.6 -1.28 -0.2 0.05
Permanent and part-time 17.64** 2.2 12.85 1.3 22.10* 1.9 0.02
Education
No formal education -4.57 -0.3 -2.95 -0.2 -13.00 -0.6 0.00
-5.95 -0.8 -11.10 -1.2 -9.20 -0.9 0.02
-5.51 -1.1 0.82 0.1 -6.62 -1.0 0.06
-0.95 -0.3 1.50 0.5 3.03 0.8 0.28
Technical diploma 6.28* 1.8 2.62 0.6 3.40 0.7 0.13
University degree 10.08** 2.0 5.84 1.0 10.59 1.5 0.07
Other qualif ication 0.82 0.2 2.80 0.5 3.11 0.5 0.06
Mother Tongue
2.30 0.5 0.37 0.1 4.56 0.7 0.22
0.12 0.0 -7.35 -1.3 -0.31 0.0 0.08
11.59 1.0 -4.24 -0.3 5.43 0.3 0.01
-2.00 -0.4 0.09 0.0 5.51 0.7 0.07
-2.41 -0.5 -9.80* -1.6 1.84 0.2 0.06
8.78 1.2 0.17 0.0 4.27 0.4 0.02
9.02 0.6 -10.88 -0.6 -9.79 -0.5 0.00
6.67 0.6 -15.44 -1.1 -32.15* -1.9 0.01
English -4.12 -0.9 -21.79*** -4.2 -35.39*** -5.7 0.08
Afrikaans 1.72 0.4 -12.07*** -2.6 -18.96*** -3.4 0.13
Dependent Variable Democracy Alliance Scale ANC Scale
Mean 55.89 73.01 70.59
Number of Observations 628 628 628
R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.22
                                 *, ** and *** denotes signif icance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.
Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
Std 2 or low er
Std 3-5
Std 6-8
IsiZulu
SeSotho
IsiNdebele
SePedi
SeTsw ana
Tsonga
IsiSw ati
Venda
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Appendix 1: Gender, Age, Skill and Home Language of 2004 
Sample 
 
 
GENDER 
 
YEAR 
 
GENDER 
2004 
Male 430 
Female 225 
 
 
AGE 
 
YEAR 
 
AGE 
2004 
18-25 37 6 
26-35 198 30 
36-45 259 40 
46-55 130 20 
56-65 29 4 
65+ 2 0 
 
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY AS DEFINED BY COMPANY 
 
YEAR 
 
OCCUPATIONAL 
CATEGORY 
2004 
Unskilled 81 12 
Semi-skilled 169 26 
Skilled 275 42 
Supervisor 61 9 
Clerical 55 8 
Other 13 2 
 
MOTHER TONGUE (HOME LANGUAGE) 
  
YEAR 
 
HOME LANGUAGE 
2004 
IsiZulu 150 23 
SeSotho 52 8 
IsiXhosa 203 31 
IsiNdebele 7 1 
SePedi 44 7 
SeTswana 39 6 
Tsonga 15 2 
IsiSwati 3 1 
Venda 6 1 
English* 54 8 
Afrikaans* 80 12 
Other 2 0 
 
* Indo-European languages are the mother tongue of South Africa’s non-African ethnic 
minorities (whites, coloureds and Indians).
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APPENDIX 2: Survey Questions and Responses 
 
(FIGURES IN ITALICS REPRESENT PERCENTAGES ROUNDED OFF TO THE NEAREST DECIMAL PLACE) 
 
DO YOU HAVE SHOP STEWARDS IN YOUR WORKPLACE? 
 
 
YEAR 
 
HAVE SHOP STEWARDS 
2004 
Yes 627 96 
No 16 3 
 
 
IF YES, WERE THEY ELECTED? 
 
 
YEAR 
 
METHOD OF ELECTION 
2004 
Elected by workers 574 92 
Other 
Appointed by union 
officials 
53 8 
 
IF ELECTED, HOW OFTEN ARE ELECTIONS FOR SHOP STEWARDS HELD? 
 
 
YEAR 
 
HOW OFTEN 
2004 
Once a year 172 28 
Less than once a 
year/ cannot 
remember 
447 72 
 
WHEN LAST DID YOU PARTICIPATE IN ELECTING YOUR SHOP STEWARD? – WITHIN LAST 2 YEARS 
 
YEAR 
 
WHEN LAST 
2004 
Within Last 2 years 383 67 
More than 2 years 
ago/never 
186  33 
 
 
 
IF YOU ELECTED SHOP STEWARDS, HOW DID YOU ELECT THEM? 
 
YEAR 
 
HOW ELECTED 
2004 
Show of hands 295 50 
Secret ballot 294 50 
 
 
WHEN YOU ELECT A SHOP STEWARD (ON AT LEAST IMPORTANT ISSUES… 
 
YEAR 
 
 
2004 
…s/he must consult 
you from time to 
time on important 
issues 
625 99 
…s/he does not have 
to consult you 
because s/he is 
elected to represent 
your interests 
8 1 
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DO YOU EXPECT THAT SHOP STEWARDS MUST REPORT BACK TO WORKERS EVERY TIME S/HE ACTS ON 
THEIR BEHALF? 
 
 2004 
Yes 531 83 
No 109 17 
 
 
 
IF A SHOP STEWARD DOES NOT DO WHAT WORKERS WANT, THE WORKERS SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO 
REMOVE HER/HIM. 
 
YEAR 
 
 
2004 
Yes 610 96 
No 25 4 
 
HOW OFTEN DO YOU ATTEND UNION MEETINGS? (AT LEAST ONCE A MONTH 
  
 
YEAR 
 
FREQUENCY OF 
ATTENDANCE 
2004 
At least once a 
month 
465 74 
Less than once a 
month 
163 26 
 
 
SHOULD COSATU AND ITS AFFILIATES SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO NATIONAL PARLIAMENT? 
 
YEAR 
 
 
2004 
Agree 571 92 
Disagree 57  8 
 
SHOULD COSATU SEND ITS REPRESENTATIVES TO PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT/LOCAL GOVERNMENT?   
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
 
 
Provincial 
Parliament 
Local Government 
Agree 562 90 561   90 
Disagree 64   10 64    10 
 
COSATU HAS ENTERED INTO AN ALLIANCE WITH THE ANC AND SACP TO CONTEST THE 2004/1998/1994 
ELECTIONS. WHAT DO YOU THINK OF THIS ARRANGEMENT? 
 
YEAR 
 
 
2004 
It is the best way 
of serving workers 
interests in 
parliament 
427 69 
Not the best way 190 31 
 
DO YOU THINK THE ALLIANCE SHOULD CONTINUE AND CONTEST THE ELECTION AFTER 2004 
 
YEAR 2004 
 
 
Yes 417 69 
No 191 31 
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WHICH PARTY ARE YOU GOING TO VOTE FOR IN THE FORTHCOMING (2004) NATIONAL ELECTIONS?  
 
YEAR 
 
 
 
2004 
ANC  472 92 
Other 42   8 
 
WHICH PARTY ARE YOU GOING TO VOTE FOR IN THE FORTHCOMING (2004) PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS? 
 
YEAR 
 
 
 
2004 
ANC 468 91 
Other  46 9 
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Endnotes  
 
                                                 
i   A third major concern – on the relative ability of unions to reach out to those employed in 
the informal sector and the unemployed – falls beyond the scope of this article (c.f. Webster 2006; Desai 
2002). 
ii   Although closed shop agreements are legal when two-thirds of employees have voted in 
favour of them, in most cases, union membership is voluntary; even in the case of a closed shop agreement, 
individual employees are permitted to refuse to join on conscientious grounds (Department of Labour 
2007a: 1). 
iii   Named after the Wiehan Commission of Enquiry. 
iv   Whilst often referred to as the ‘ultra left’, critics of the Alliance and the perceived 
unresponsiveness of COSATU leadership to the rank and file, include both activists and intellectuals 
working within sections of the labour movement and the South African Communist Party, orthodox 
Trotskyists and unaligned thinkers.  A grouping of scholars associated or linked with the University of 
Witwatersrand’s Sociology of Work Programme (SWOP) have been closely identified both with the unions 
and with work defending COSATU’s policies and structure (Habib 2007: 12-13).  However, whilst placing 
a strong emphasis on empirical rigour (c.f. Webster 1997), SWOP-based research has not been uncritical, 
pointing to both internal divisions in the unions (Von Holdt 2002) and the problems the unions are 
experiencing in outreach (Webster 2004).   
v   The 1998 Employment Equity Act requires designated employers (those with 50 or more 
workers), and the public sector (excluding security services) to provide equal employment opportunities 
and to take ‘reasonable’ measures to ensure equitable representation at all levels (Department of Labour 
2007b).  
vi  Most notably in the following areas: 
- In 1994, 76% of respondents felt that shopstewards should consult very time they acted on 
behalf of workers; by 2004, this was down to 63%.  This could reflect a greater ‘trust’ in the 
structures of representative democracy (c.f. Burnell 2003a: 255). 
- Attendance at union meetings: by 2004, workers were less likely to attend union meetings 
weekly, but fewer workers never attended meetings than was the case in 1997.  However, 
overall attendance levels remained generally high. For logistical reasons, we excluded 
COSATU’s smallest affiliates and SAMA.   
We used close ended questions (except in a few instances, the results of which were not used for this 
paper), with the responses being recorded by the interviewer in the relevant box for later data capture.  The 
survey was funded by SANPAD (South Africa-Netherlands Research Programme on Alternatives in 
Development).   
vii   Respondents were also asked whether they had served as shopsteward. 26% had, a 
roughly similar figure to the 1998 survey.   We also asked respondents if they had been involved in local 
government, community development, or participatory initiatives beyond the workplace as a union delegate 
– 8% had. 
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